One contribution of 11 to a theme issue 'Responding and adapting to climate change: uncertainty as knowledge' .
Sixty years after industry executives first decided to fight the facts of tobacco, the exploitation of doubt and uncertainty as a defensive tactic has spread to a diverse set of industries and issues with an interest in challenging scientific evidence. However, one can find examples of doubt-mongering before tobacco. One involves the early history of electricity generation in the USA. In the 1920s, the American National Electric Light Association ran a major propaganda campaign against public sector electricity generation, focused on the insistence that privately generated electricity was cheaper and that public power generation was socialistic and therefore unAmerican. This campaign included advertisements, editorials (generally ghost-written), the rewriting of textbooks and the development of high school and college curricula designed to cast doubt on the costeffectiveness of public electricity generation and extol the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism. It worked in large part by finding, cultivating and paying experts to endorse the industry's claims in the mass media and the public debate, and to legitimatize the alterations to textbooks and curricula. The similarities between the electric industry strategy and the defence of tobacco, lead paint and fossil fuels suggests that these strategies work for reasons that are not specific to the particular technical claims under consideration. This paper argues that a reason for the cultural persistence of doubt is what we may label the 'fact of uncertainty'. Uncertainty is intrinsic to science, and this creates vulnerabilities that interested parties may, and commonly do, exploit, both by attempting to challenge the specific conclusions of technical experts and by implying that those conclusions threaten other social values.
Introduction: doubt as an academic problem
In the 1950s, the tobacco industry established a programme to defend its product against the scientific evidence of its harms. Working with the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, industry executives realized that they could compete with the body of fact that was emerging from scientific research by insisting that the science was not yet settled-in effect, by putting 'the body of fact' in scare quotes-and so it would be wrong, or at least premature, to restrict customer choice by banning their product or even discouraging its use.
Scholars including Allan Brandt, Robert Proctor, Sharon Eubanks, Stanton Glantz and Lisa Bero have documented the tortuous history of tobacco industry doubt-mongering, both as a commercial art form and as a criminal enterprise [2] [3] [4] [5] . These scholars have shown that, over more than half a century, the tobacco industry deliberately delayed and diluted efforts to control tobacco use and protect public health by raising doubts about the biomedical science that demonstrates its harms (harms that include diverse cancers, heart disease, various forms of respiratory illness, sudden infant death syndrome and many other forms of mortality and morbidity). Markowitz & Rosner [6, 7] have shown how similar strategies and tactics were used over many decades by the vinyl chloride and lead paint industries. In his 2008 book, Doubt is their Product, Michaels [8] casts a still wider net, documenting similar patterns in diverse industries producing consumer products such as tobacco, aspirin, herbicides and asbestos, as well as using dangerous chemicals and materials, such as benzene and beryllium, known to cause occupational disease (see also [9, 10] ). McGarity & Wagner [11] have shown how these strategies have been introduced into the legal system, as corporations facing litigation over alleged harms try to discredit scientific evidence adverse to their interests, in part by emphasizing uncertainties in that evidence.
Despite the extensive exposure of the tobacco industry's activities and its prosecution in the USA by the US Department of Justice under the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute [5] , doubt-mongering as a strategy continues to be used by diverse stakeholders to undermine science related to dangerous products and activities [1, 8, 12] . Popular writers and political critics have called these activities an 'assault on reason', a 'war on science', an 'inquisition' and a form of 'wilful ignorance' and 'irrationality' [13] [14] [15] [16] . No doubt various forms of ignorance and irrationality-both wilful and inadvertent-play a role in these matters. But most of the scholars who have studied the matter have suggested that the consistency of the pattern indicates that these activities are neither irrational nor based on ignorance, wilful or otherwise. The central argument of most of the relevant scholarly works is that the strategies employed are conscious, deliberate and organized. Michaels has labelled the strategy 'manufacturing uncertainty' ([8] , on p. x; see also [9, 10] )-a term that is also taken up by McGarity & Wagner [11] . This term usefully focuses attention both on its structured character and on the key role of uncertainty, insofar as the centrepiece of the doubt-mongering strategy is to insist that the relevant science is too uncertain to provide a good basis for decision-making.
However, the notion of manufacturing uncertainty may not capture an important element, which is that uncertainty does not need to be manufactured. Uncertainty is intrinsic to science, and it is this intrinsic aspect that is used to advantage. To wit: epidemiology is a statistical science, so there is always uncertainty about the cause of any one particular case. Tobacco use does cause lung cancer, but so does exposure to asbestos and radon [2, 3, 8] . Lead paint causes neurological damage, but so do many other things [7] . Greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change, but so do solar variation and atmospheric aerosols, and the impacts of climate change are probabilistic, not deterministic, so there is always uncertainty in the attribution of particular effects [1, 12, 17, 18] . And so on. The complexity of science and the inescapable uncertainties surrounding scientific claims offer a rich landscape of opportunities to challenge science.
Moreover, novel claims are by definition uncertain, which is why the emergence of scientific consensus is a pertinent marker, insofar as it indicates that the relevant expert community has accepted the claim as established knowledge ( [19] , although also see [20] ). Thus, one recurrent part of the doubt-mongering strategy is to challenge the existence of consensus by highlighting dissent, either by finding and cultivating individuals who diverge from the broader consensus or by creating them if they do not already exist. By highlighting disagreement among experts, stakeholders generate doubt in the minds of broader publics. As suggested by the infamous memo from which Michaels' book takes its title-what was manufactured was not uncertainty, but doubt. The genius of the tobacco industry (if we may call it that) was to use uncertainty to create doubt, and thereby undermine knowledge claims.
Moreover, it can be argued that the salience of uncertainty in science is a good thing: the version we call curiosity or healthy scepticism drives scientific investigation. When scientists doubt existing explanations for phenomena, it motivates them to learn more about the world. Being honest about uncertainties-discussing the sources of error and ambiguity in one's experiments and providing error bars on one's measurements-is an essential element of scientific integrity [21] .
At the same time, the salience of uncertainty makes science vulnerable to misrepresentation: it is easy to take uncertainties out of context to make them appear more significant than experts consider them to be. This was the tobacco industry's key insight: that you could use normal scientific uncertainty to undermine the status of stabilized scientific knowledge. You could take statements that scientists considered to be uncontroversial and contest them simply by raising questions (even irrelevant ones, and ones whose answers you knew perfectly well). You could create the impression of scientific debate by establishing alternative journals and encouraging (or paying) scientists to publish in them. And you could persuade consumers, journalists and politicians that there was sustained scientific controversy by soliciting a handful of experts-or even just one-to state publicly that they held a dissenting view. As in jujitsu, you could use science against itself. In doing so, the tobacco industry-and many others-flipped science on its head to produce ignorance rather than knowledge.
Historians Proctor & Schiebinger [22] have coined the term 'agnotology' to describe the social construction of ignorance and its study as a scholarly problem. In their 2008 edited volume, scholars explored the diverse areas in which agnotological activities could be discerned. These essays ranged widely, from contemporary issues such as climate change, genetically modified crops and the (mis)undersanding of human female orgasm to historical topics such as the suppression of West Indian knowledge of abortifacients in the eighteenth century and native American knowledge of fossils from colonial periods to the present. These diverse examples illustrate the ways in which interested parties have suppressed knowledge that was useful to others but adverse to their own interests. Considered in concert with the scholarship already discussed, we discern the construction of ignorance as a persistent activity (at least in Western nations). This permits us to recognize certain patterns and to ask why these patterns appear to be so persistent.
Previous work has suggested that the tobacco industry's tactics were effective because people liked their product and did not want to believe that it was harmful; because the scientific evidence was probabilistic and therefore confusing to many people (even scientists); and because the industry hired consummate professionals and paid them large sums of money to spread their message of doubt [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Recently, philosopher McIntyre [16] has argued that manifestations of wilful ignorance are particularly fostered in the age of the Internet. These factors are clearly important: people enjoy smoking tobacco, and the Internet has facilitated broad access to scientific claims and counterclaims about nutrition, vaccine safety, climate change and many other matters [3, 4, [23] [24] [25] . But this does not seem to be the whole story, as previous work also makes clear that successful exploitation of uncertainty is restricted neither to pleasurable products nor to the age of the Internet. Indeed, the contrast between the diversity of the domains in which ignorance has been constructed and the similarities in the manner in which it has been done suggests that the construction of ignorance does not depend on the particular vulnerabilities of any particular science (e.g. epidemiology) nor on any particular time period or cultural setting (e.g. the age of the Internet).
This paper attempts to contribute to the growing corpus of scholarship on this subject by examining an additional example that historians have noted in passing but not considered in depth: the campaign by the US electricity industry to undermine support for public generation of electricity, by claiming (counter-factually) that it was not cost-effective and that it would undermine the American way of life. The similarities between the electric industry strategy and the defence of tobacco, lead paint, fossil fuels and other products suggest that these strategies work for reasons that are not specific to the particular technical claims under consideration. This paper seeks to call attention to this observation: that the strategies used to create doubt in diverse settings are strikingly similar, even in regard to issues that might seem in their technical aspects to be quite different. The argument of the paper is that this can be understood by calling attention to the central role of uncertainty, and specifically the manner in which the intrinsic uncertainty of technical, expert knowledge creates vulnerabilities that interested parties may and commonly do exploit, both by attempting to challenge the specific conclusions of technical experts and by implying that those conclusions threaten other social values.
Electricity generation in the USA
One of the great technological developments of the twentieth century was electricity generation, and its use to power homes around the globe. It is hard to overstate now novel, how important, and how good most people in the early-twentieth century considered electricity to be. By the 1920s, many urban Americans had electricity in their homes, and, with that, a great sense of satisfaction that the future was being realized before their eyes. Power (in the sense of electricity) was equated with power (in the sense of empowerment), and people thrilled to witness electric lights in streets, in conspicuous displays at events such as the St Louis World's Fair and, above all, in their own homes [26] .
Pennsylvania governor Gifford Pinchot-famous to historians as the first chief of the US Forest Survey and friend of President Theodore Roosevelt-was typical of the era in asserting that the high US standard of living was 'mainly due to our use of greater quantities of power per inhabitant than any other people on Earth' [27, p. iii]. Lack of power, he believed, was the major factor holding back human progress. Power was also the answer to the Malthusian problem of population outstripping agricultural production, because, with the development of steam power in the industrial revolution, 'for the first time in history goods could be produced in abundance for all mankind' [27, p. iv]. But as physical power flowed, so did political power, as steam concentrated wealth, and thus political influence, in the captains of industry who managed successfully to exploit it.
Moreover, as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, steam was still almost entirely a technology of industry: almost no one had steam power in their homes. Electricity offered the prospect of energy available to all on equal terms. Electricity was modern, it was good, and it was democratic. Perhaps for this reason, Americans in the early-twentieth century were proud of the fact that the USA used as much electrical energy as 'all the rest of the world combined' [26, p. 339] . If using power was good, then using more power was better.
But not all Americans were using it equally. In fact, some were not using it at all. Electricity generation in the USA was mostly the work of entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse (who manufactured generators and other necessary equipment in for-profit enterprises) and private utilities that used that equipment to produce and sell electricity as a commodity. This model proved highly successful in urban areas, but rural areas were another matter [26] [27] [28] . By the early 1930s, most urban Americans had access to electricity, but most rural Americans did not.
Electricity had been heavily marketed and promoted by private utilities for its capacity to save labour, but the rural Americans who (it was argued) laboured longest and hardest had seen little electricity reach their homes. By the 1920s, there were some municipal utilities, as well as farmer's cooperatives, but electricity was mainly generated in the private sector, by utilities that were regulated by state commissions. (It has been estimated that, by 1937, less than 10% of generation or generating capacity rested in municipal utilities.) The typical utility, in the earlytwentieth century, was a privately owned one that served 'a relatively small area from a single generating station in a single state' [29, p. 69] . And that small area was almost always urban. Historian David Nye notes that, while more than two-thirds of most northern Europeans farmers by the 1920s had electricity at reasonable rates, more than 90% of US famers did not, and those few who did paid much higher rates-often double-than urban customers [26, p. 287] .
The reason for this discrepancy between the USA and Europe was not technical, but social. European governments, viewing electricity as a public good, had developed electricity in either publicly owned utilities or in public-private partnerships that made rural electrification a high priority [26, 28] . In contrast, privately owned utilities saw little profit in bringing expensive lines to sparsely populated regions. Most farmers lived too far from available grids to purchase electricity, and those who did not were often too poor to be able to afford it. Advocates of rural electrification argued that it was the hard-working farm family that most needed electricity, but such arguments carried little weight in the calculus of private enterprise. As General Electric concluded in 1925, 'the purchasing power of . . . 1.9 million [farmers] is too low to put them in the potential customer class' [26, p. 297] .
(a) Holding companies
Besides failing to serve rural Americans, private sector electricity generation as a 'natural monopoly' had created problems that even as staunch a defender of free market capitalism as Herbert Hoover acknowledged. It was the problem of holding companies.
In the 1920s, US utilities began to develop large networks that required substantial upfront investment. This was a major factor in the development of holding companies, which gained control of utilities by purchasing their stock on the open market. Holding companies were able to raise the level of finance needed to develop and extend transmission lines, in part because they were more well known to investors than the myriad of small utilities that they began to assemble under their aegis; some scholars have likened them to 'mutual funds specialising in utilities' [29, p. 72] . Large holding companies were also able to develop technical expertise that small utilities could not, and to benefit from economies of scale. The period of rapid growth of the holding companies, in the 1920s, was also a period of rapid growth in electricity use in manufacturing, which led in turn to significant productivity growth [28, 29] .
But there were substantial problems. Holding companies engaged in various questionable financial activities, including the sale of highly inflated securities, some of which led to speculative bubbles and substantial investor losses. Investigators would later conclude that these activities contributed to the stock market crash that heralded the great Depression. This led Congress to pass the Holding Company Act of 1935, which, among several restrictions, limited their activities to a single state, so that they would fall under the jurisdiction of state regulators. (This act was repealed in 2005.)
Holding companies also engaged in activities that subverted regulation. In the nineteenth century (in cases related to railroads), courts had held that, under conditions of natural monopolies, states could regulate rates so long as those rates ensured a fair rate of return on the value of the investment. Of course, 'fair' was subject to interpretation, as was the value of the investment; the regulatory structure rested as well on accurate information as to operating expenses and revenues. In the railway cases, judicial challenges to commission decisions were widespread, often blocking implementation for years, and in any case semi-official corruption was rife [28] [29] [30] . If the term 'regulatory capture ' was not yet prevalent, the phenomenon certainly was: most state regulatory commissions were heavily influenced if not actually controlled by the large utility holding companies. Even where commissioners wished to enact meaningful rate regulations, they were often subverted by the companies' creative accounting methods. One example involved the holding companies charging fees to the utilities they operated; these would be presented to the commissions as operating costs (which would then be passed onto consumers), but the commissions had no way no way to distinguish these fees from true operating expenditures.
As holding companies grew in size and power, concerns about them also grew. Some political leaders began to speak disparagingly of a 'power trust' that would hold the American people effectively hostage. The companies were rich and powerful, yet they were not serving all Americans, and there was reason to believe that they were cheating the ones they were serving. Perhaps a different system was needed. These thoughts led to a national conversation on electricity generation, and one leader in that conversation was Pennsylvania governor Gifford Pinchot.
(b) Gifford Pinchot and the giant power plan
In 1923, and led by Governor Pinchot, the state legislature passed the Giant Power Survey Act, authorizing a study to determine the feasibility of a publicly promoted project to bring electricity to all residents in the state at a fair price [31, p. 26] . It was estimated that 90% of rural Pennsylvanians did not have electricity, but the study concluded that affordable state-wide electrification was feasible, although not by the private sector working alone. It could be done by generating electricity at or near coal mines, and connecting that generating capacity to lines that ran across the state. This could be done by the private sector so long as one condition was met: 'the effective public regulation of the electric industry' [32] .
The essential distinction drawn was between Giant Power-to be regulated by the state for the benefit of all citizens-and Super Power-owned and operated by the private sector for the benefits only of some. The 480-page report laid out in considerable detail how that could and should be done. It began with a message from the governor in which he summarized the key elements of the plan:
(1) Mass production was key to reducing costs. This would be achieved by generating electricity at or very near to coal mines, and building large capacity transmission lines connecting with all other lines across the state. (2) A state-wide grid would be systematically extended across the state into all rural areas so all potential consumers would be served. The state would regulate rates and services, and manage security issues. (3) The state would create a common power pool. All current generated would contribute to the grid and all power would be taken from the grid. (4) The idea of a natural monopoly in generation would be replaced by competition among producers, all of whom would have access to the state-run grid. If farmers created cooperatives ('mutual companies') to purchase power, providers would be obligated to sell to them at the regulated rates.
Pinchot stressed that for an annual expense of less than 3% of their present construction costs existing companies could have brought electricity to half of all farms in Pennsylvania, but they had not. '[T]heir almost complete failure to bring about rural electrification makes legislative relief imperative' [27, p. viii]. Giant Power did not entail state ownership of the electricity industry, but it did call for active involvement and affirmative regulation. Rural electricity was a market failure, and the government would step in where the market had failed. Pinchot's aspiration for Giant Power was frankly utopian-that 'the drudgery of human life can be taken from the shoulders of men and women who toil, and [be] replaced by the power of electricity' [27, p. v]-but the argument presented for it was empirical. Pinchot stressed that the report 'proposes to deal with facts as it finds them' [27, p. viii]. The epigraph insisted that 'Electrical development has brought the Commonwealth to the threshold of momentous changes in industry and transportation and in the life of the people . . . To act wisely in this situation facts must be our guide'. These declarations-supported by the copious detail presented in the report-were no doubt a nod towards a problem the report's authors knew they would face: industry resistance in the form of empirical counterclaims and disinformation.
Giant Power was not socialist in the sense of government ownership of the means of production, but it certainly threatened private interests. No doubt for this reason Pinchot stressed that he was not advocating public ownership. On the contrary, he was trying to find a means to avoid it. 'If the people of the United States ever turn to the nation-wide public ownership of electric utilities, it will be because the companies have driven them to it' [27, p. x]. The Giant Power Survey Board stressed that 'respect for investors' rights was essential to the continued attraction of the capital needed to finance expansion [32, pp. [3] [4] . However, the proposal did envisage a Giant Power Board authorized to construct and operate coal-generating power plants, to mine the needed coal; to appropriate land as needed to mine coal in specific locations to generate power; to build and operate transmission lines or issue permits to others to do so; to set rates for all power generated and sold in the state; and to negotiate to buy and sell electricity to other states. Moreover, the goals of Giant Power were communal in the sense that its guiding idea, as opposed to other schemes in operation or proposed, was not 'greater profit to the companies' but 'greater advantage to the people' [27, p. viii] .
This idea was not just a product of Pinchot's imagination, he had a model in mind: the success of Canadian government in bringing electricity from Niagara Falls to farmers across Ontario. In Ontario, the provincial government had brought electricity to nearly all its citizens, and at costs that were lower than the privately generated electricity available just across the Falls. And it was this key fact-that public electricity was cheaper-that the industry began to fight.
The National Electric Lighting Association response
Industry leaders insisted that the alleged facts about Ontario power were not facts at all. (They also worked to prevent Pinchot's re-election. He eked out a victory, but the narrow margin was probably mostly due to his support for prohibition.) More than that, they linked their opposition to a general campaign of advertising, public relations and academic influence intended to counter any suggestion that public generation or management of electricity was desirable, to strengthen the conviction of the American people that the private sector did best, and to promote the idea that anything other than private control of industry was socialistic and therefore un-American. Specifically they argued that (1) private ownership works: electricity rates are fair, service is good and the public is adequately protected by state regulation; federal involvement in electricity would be inappropriate, socialistic, and lead to tyranny; (2) private ownership alone gives opportunity for individual initiative, which is the cornerstone of US national success and prosperity; and, therefore, (3) government involvement in activities that should properly be the domain of free enterprise will undermine individual initiative and ultimately destroy American prosperity.
Most of this argument was made not by the specific utilities or holding companies themselves, but through the efforts of a trade organization: the National Electric Light Association (NELA). Created in 1885, NELA represented more than 500 of the largest privately owned electrical utilities, accounting for more than 90% of US kilowatt output [26, 28, 33, 34] . In the 1920s, NELA and its members, separately and together, had worked to stop the Muscle Shoals and Hoover Dam projects. Muscle Shoals was a proposal to generate hydroelectric power on the Tennessee River, use the inexpensive electricity generated to run a fertilizer manufacturing plant, and sell any excess to local consumers (a forerunner to what would become the Tennessee Valley Authority). Although approved by both houses of Congress, it was heavily opposed by the electrical industry, and the authorizing legislation was vetoed by President Herbert Hoover as an inappropriate government intervention in the marketplace.
Hoover endorsed building dams for flood control or to aid navigation-which he saw as legitimate federal functions and not appropriate domains of private enterprise-but rejected the idea of the government competing directly with the private sector. The argument was not one of practicality or economic efficiency but of the proper function and limits of government. For 'the Federal Government deliberately to go out to build up and expand such an occasion to the major purpose of a power and manufacturing business is to break down the initiative and enterprise of the American people; it is the negation of the ideals upon which our civilization has been based . . .', Hoover argued. 'I hesitate to contemplate the future of our institutions, of our Government, and of our country if the preoccupation of its officials is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal opportunity but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That is not liberalism, it is degeneration' (http://college.cengage.com/history/ ayers_primary_sources/vetoesmuscle_shoalsbill_1931.htm).
In hindsight, one might concede Hoover's point: the values of governance should not be the same as the values of the marketplace. However, the private sector had failed to provide power to all but a tiny fraction of potential rural customers. Moreover, as Pinchot had argued, evidence suggested that the private sector-operating as a functional or natural monopoly-was overcharging even its urban customers: electricity generation in the government-operated system in Canada was cheaper than that by its private counterparts just below the border. This was the rub-so the industry challenged it.
Electricity executives insisted that they were providing electricity as cheaply and efficiently as possible and to as many people as they could, but a good deal of data suggested this was not so, and many people were saying this publicly. In 1921, Samuel Insull, the industrialist credited with building the electricity infrastructure of Chicago (and who would later see his entire enterprise collapse in the Great Depression), decided that the industry needed to do something affirmative to defend itself, proposing 'a great campaign of education in the colleges and other institutions of learning' ( [28] , quote in [33, p. 28] ). In the 1920s, NELA did just thatexcept that both contemporary critics and later analysts would consider it not education but propaganda.
In the late 1920s, the US Federal Trade Commission began hearings on the activities that constituted this campaign. The hearings lasted 6 years-almost as long as the NELA campaign itself-and created a 'bookshelf' of reports. In fact, it created a whole bookcase: 71 volumes comprising 11 000 pages [35] . Fortunately, economic historians William J. Hausman and John L. Neufeld have managed to summarize their conclusions in a single sentence: that 'private utilities, led by its [sic] industry trade group, the National Electric Light Association, had mounted a large and sophisticated propaganda campaign that placed particular emphasis on making the case for private ownership to the press and in schools and universities' [29, p. 74] . David Nye explains further: 'The thousand of pages of [the US Federal Trade Commission] testimony revealed a systematic covert attempt to shape opinion in favour of private utilities, in which half truths and at times outright lies presented municipal utilities in a consistently bad light' [26, p. 340] . Paul Monticone, writing on the role of film in this campaign, has commented on its 'outlandish use of virtually every form of communication then available' to discredit municipal ownership and extol the virtues of free market capitalism [35] .
The assessment of these historians is consistent with the two available accounts offered by participants at the time. One was Ernest Gruening, a US Senator from Alaska who followed the alter the entire American educational system, from grade school to university. The alteration was designed to ensure 'straight economic thinking'-by which was meant free-market principlesand to ensure the possession by young people and their teachers of 'correct information'. The goal was to mould the minds not just of the current generation but also of succeeding generations. The industry would count the programme as a success when judges, lawmakers, members of public utility commissions, prosecuting attorneys and engineers, 'in short, all public officials-will be so trained as automatically to oppose genuine regulation, public ownership, honest valuations, equitable rates, etc.' and public opinion would be 'created so that voters will elect officials who will approve such policies as benefit the industry' [34, p. 3] . The FTC found that damage had been done, as indicated 'by false and misleading statements of fact, as well as opinions on public policy, found in reports and expert testimony of prominent university professors who are now discovered to have been in the pay of the private utilities' [34, p. 3] .
The key opinions that NELA promoted were that publicly owned or managed electrical utilities were less efficient and more expensive that privately run utilities, that state regulation was sufficient to protect public interest, and that federal involvement was not only unnecessary but would be counter-productive, even tyrannical. These opinions were embedded in a larger argument that private property was the foundation not only of the American economy but also of American life, so that any attempt to interfere with the private operation of the electricity industry threatened to undermine that way of life. Opinions to the contrary were unsound, socialistic and fundamentally un-American. The FTC found that the 'character and objective of these activities was fully recognized by NELA and its sponsors as propaganda' [33, p. xiii] .
What is of particular salience in the context of this volume is the exploitation of uncertainty, and the role of academics in that. The NELA propaganda campaign was possible, in part, because the price of electricity was uncertain, because the relevant data were not generally publicly available, and there were significant differences of technical opinion as to how various subsidies, tax credits and external costs should be accounted. As for the appropriate role of government in the marketplace, that was necessarily uncertain, as it was both a matter of empirical evidence (as to how past government interactions had worked out) as well as a matter of judgement and values. In this context, diverse arguments could be created to undermine the dominant expert view that public electricity was cheaper, and that at least some government involvement was required to prevent private sector abuses. But to make the counter-arguments appear credible-and empirical-NELA needed experts. Academics would play a crucial role.
The National Electric Light Association academic campaign
The NELA academic programme had three major components: (i) the recruitment of experts to produce studies offering competing facts on the central question of the cost and efficiency of private versus public electricity generation; (ii) the rewriting of textbooks to support and promote the goals of the private electricity industry, including denying charges of corruption and promulgating an image of the industry as ethical and trustworthy; and (iii) the revision of existing academic programmes and creation of new ones to foster belief in the free market principles. The first goal was intended to prevent the development of municipal electricity programmes in the present; the second two were intended to ensure the long-term dominance of private electricity in American life.
(a) Recruiting experts and constructing competing facts
The principal point of factual contention was the cost of electricity generation. However, by NELA's admission the goal was not to support objective study of the matter, but to 'kill' the municipal ownership idea. As one document testified: 'the information we want is information showing the failure of municipal ownership, its inefficiency compared with private operation and the fact that municipal ownership, in the last analysis, is more expensive' [ There were two aspects to this. The first was the price of private electricity. Under existing regulatory structures, utilities were entitled to a 'reasonable' rate of return. This was generally thought to lie between 5.5% and 6.5%, but at least one study at the time showed that most companies were making at least 7%; many were making 8% or even 9%. This meant that companies were overcharging their customers to the tune of millions or even tens of millions of dollars per year. The second was the cost of public electricity. Much of this debate surrounded the Ontario hydropower system, a government-run operation that brought power to residents across Ontario at lower costs than the privately generated power that US citizens were buying just across Niagara Falls. NELA responded by recruiting academics to undertake studies purporting to demonstrate that Ontario hydro was more expensive [33, p. xxiii].
Chief among these was E.A. Stewart, a professor of agricultural engineering at the University of Minnesota, who (perhaps ironically) had helped to develop the Red Wing Project on Utilization of Electricity in Agriculture, a project to test the feasibility and value of bringing electricity to farmers (http://bbe.umn.edu/sites/bbe.umn.edu/files/BBEs%20Rich%20History.pdf) and (http://www.asabe.org/awards-landmarks/asabe-historic-landmarks/the-red-wing-project-onutilization-of-electricity-in-agriculture-53.aspx). His study was promoted as 'an impartial and scholarly survey of rural electrification' and widely disseminated by NELA committees and discussed in their bulletins, press releases and editorials. Its central finding was that Ontario hydropower was more expensive than privately generated power in the USA, and that farmers there were worse off than they might otherwise be [33, p. 72] .
Stewart had claimed that his report had been vetted and approved by the Engineering Department at Ontario Hydro Electric Power, but proponents of municipal power were sceptical and reached out to the Ontario Hydroelectric Power Commission for confirmation [33, pp. 72,73] . They found that the Ontario engineers had checked the data, but they had also alerted Stewart to various discrepancies that were not corrected in the final report. 'Not only are the figures published in Stewart's report incorrect in many instances, but statements throughout the report are not in accordance with the facts', the chairman of Hydro-Ontario stated [33, pp. 74,75] .
Nevertheless, Stewart's report was widely cited in newspaper articles and editorials around the country, and repeatedly cited by NELA members as proof that public electricity was not as cheap as its proponents claimed. NELA committees (and their third-party allies) across the country sent out bulletins, letters and editorials promoting its results. In December 1927, the Boston Herald published a full-page article, with an eight-column headline, based on Stewart's work entitled 'Here is the Truth about Ontario Hydro-Electric'. Power officials were jubilant, writing 'we shall make good use of this' [33, p. 198] .
Nor was Stewart's the only such study. A professor at the University of Colorado was paid $1692-close to a full year's academic salary-for a survey of costs at municipally owned power plants in Colorado, which, not surprisingly, offered conclusions that were unfavourable to the municipal plants [33, p. 46] . At the University of Missouri, an economics professor prepared a report-widely disseminated by Missouri Power and Light-based on data supplied by the industry, which by the latter's admission were 'selected' [33, p. 70] . At the University of Iowa, an electrical engineering professor had been paid to prepare a series of reports contrasting rates from public and private electrical generating facilities in the state. The findings were very favourable to the private side, and NELA distributed the report 'just as widely as we could legitimately' [33, p. 67] .
These studies played a crucial role in the public debate. The American people were told that independent academics had shown that public power was more expensive than private power. What they did not know was that the academics were not independent and their conclusions were not true.
(b) Rewriting textbooks
To ensure that their efforts would have a long-term impact, NELA executives also sought to rewrite textbooks. The hoped-for texts would foster among school children and college students The programme began with a review of textbooks; the plan was to persuade publishers to discontinue textbooks that the industry considered unacceptable; to contact authors and editors to suggest revisions to textbooks that could be revised; and to recruit professors to write new texts resonant with NELA's point of view. The review included texts used on both the secondary and university levels; the principal focus was on texts for civics, economics and business courses. The secretary of NELA's Missouri Committee on Public Information concluded that most were 'wholly valueless, and in many instances poisonous'. He attributed this state of affairs to the fact that '97% of the textbooks used in the public schools affecting public utilities are written by socialists'. The director of NELA's Texas Public Service Information Bureau came to a similar conclusion: 'All textbooks used in the schools are more or less erroneous on the utilities and generally on the fundamentals of economics. [NELA should recruit] some proper textbook-writer in preparing an honest textbook in civics for use in the high schools . . .' [33, p. 83] .
NELA executives made a list of specific words, terms and claims that they found objectionable and wanted removed. These included over-capitalization, stock watering, abuses in rate making, weakness in regulatory practices and in some contexts, even, taxation, reasonable rates and fair return [33, pp. 87-88] . Among the statements to which NELA objected were the claims that municipal generation was cheaper than private generation; that the industry as a whole had engaged in questionable financial dealings and that utilities had been involved in corrupting the political process; and that the latter had led people to look for remedies. J. B. Sheridan, chairman of the NELA Subcommittee on Textbooks, offered specifics: 'Some of the textbooks state that the utilities are or were overcapitalized, have 'watered their stock', and impose excessive rates upon their customers to enable them to make financial returns upon alleged capital investment which does not in fact exist' [33, p. 84] . (In the 1930s, investigators would conclude that the industry had done just these things; the fact that the claims were in high school textbooks in the 1920s suggests that these activities were already widely known.) They also objected to the characterization of their industry as 'private'-insisting that they were the true public entities because they were owned by their shareholders. (They neglected to note that most of the shares held by the public did not carry voting rights.) One passage that NELA officials found particularly objectionable explained how industry shady dealings had led people to conclude that government control of natural monopolies was required:
In the past, public service corporations have often 'watered' their securities; that is they have issued shares of stock and bonds beyond the real value of the property . . . In order to pay the interest on such securities, companies have frequently levied high charges and given poor service. When the franchises which have made their high profits possible have been in danger, they have at times bribed city officials, broken the laws, misled public opinion by controlling the newspapers though their advertising, and expended large sums of money to elect men to city councils, and even to State legislatures, who would vote for measures they wanted. In these ways they have menaced good government and have caused many people to become advocates of government ownership [33, p. 92] .
NELA rated the textbooks as good, fair, unfair, bad and very bad, and then approached publishers to persuade them to either abandon the bad texts or rewrite them. The strategy was to gain cooperation from large publishers first, on the theory that, once they were 'straightened out and are working with us, the small publishers will naturally fall in line'. One official reported making a 'good start' with the 'largest school book publishing house, who printed over 12 000 000 books last year . . . which will be a tremendous leverage on any other house should opposition occur' [33, pp. 86,102] .
NELA officials reported positively on the cooperation they were receiving from many publishing houses in relation to high school texts in economics, civics and government. When a new text proved satisfactory, NELA or its members paid for copies to be distributed. In Missouri, for example, the St Joseph Gas Company helped to pay for copies of a new book to be sent to every high school principal in the state. NELA officials also contacted school administrators, librarians and teachers suggesting that they should abandon the objectionable texts and adopt the new ones. The approach appears to have met with considerable success: 'Where textbooks which were grossly unfair . . . were used in the high schools, we took the matter up personally with school officials, either through local [electricity] managers or directly [by NELA] . . . In nearly every instance where such textbooks were used they were removed and placed on the library shelves for use as reference matter only' [33, p. 105] .
Not every effort was successful, of course. College professors tended to be more touchy about interference than publishers, and there were a few (albeit only a few) documented examples of professors rejecting industry approaches outright. A Professor H. C. Brearley of Clemson College returned a letter from the NELA group in South Carolina inviting his participation in the textbook survey, stating: 'I consider the censorship of textbooks as one of the most objectionable and reprehensible of the practices of so-called big business' [34, p. 10] . One series of pamphlets with titles including 'The Romance of the Kilowatt' fell particularly flat, and one effort triggered a backlash, when an industry-sponsored pamphlet was published by the Smithsonian Institution with a forward by secretary Charles D. Walcott. An uproar ensued, and the Smithsonian withdrew the pamphlet and destroyed the plates [34, pp. 26,27] .
Incidents like this may have contributed to the industry realization that, for this work to be effective, the materials produced had to be seen as neutral and objective. Thus, like the tobacco industry in later years, the electric power industry took care to try to create the perception of independence of the authors and to avoid the hard sell. 'Be careful to avoid seeming to force material on schoolmen', one industry executive advised, 'Get them to ask for it'. They also realized that to impose a textbook upon a professor was not an easy thing to do. In any case, textbooks did not stand alone; they had to work in conjunction with what was being taught in courses. So a third component of the academic campaign was direct intervention in university academic programmes to develop courses and curricula that would deliver the desired message.
(c) Educational programmes
In the long run, NELA would consider its campaign a success when there was a broad social consensus around free market principles and their crucial role in American prosperity and culture. If that occurred, then a future generation of citizens would not need to be influenced because they would already hold appropriate views. In a speech entitled 'Government in Business', given by the president of the People's [sic] Gas, Light & Coke Co. of Chicago, summarized what these views would entail:
Prosperity, unparalleled in distribution as well as in degree, abounds in the United States not only because of our country's natural resources but also and chiefly because business has had here so little interference from government. It abounds because here in the United States individual initiative and enterprise and energy have had full play as no where else [33, p. 145 ].
Another NELA representative put it this way:
When we think of the freedom that is given to every man, woman and child in America to develop the spark of divinity with which he is endowed . . . it is almost unbelievable that there could be found those who would tear down this marvelous system. And yet, there are today subversive movements at work in our land, fathered and fostered by those who . . . would foist on America the shockingly brutal lowering system of certain backward civilizations. Today, they are marshaling their forces in an attempt to put government into the electric business . . . How long, my friends, will it be, after the electric industry is stifled before the same principles will be applied to the lumber business, under the guise of conservation, and reforestation, and the coal business and the grocery business, and every business . . . [33, pp. 223,224] . The reference to forestry and conservation was a thinly disguised attack on Pinchot; the rest was an even less thinly disguised attack on anyone who highlighted the limits-much less the failures-of the private sector economy. What was needed was for everyone to understand that free market capitalism, prosperity and the American way of life were one and the same. How better to do that than by ensuring that this was taught in American universities?
Much of this work was done by state-based committees, such as the NELA Illinois Committee on Public Utility Information, which played a major role in outreach to colleges and universities. Programmes of 'reciprocal relations' were established across the USA, including at the Universities of Washington, Oregon, Ohio, West Virginia, Wyoming, Missouri, Illinois and Oregon, Washington State University, Penn State, Harvard, Northwestern and Purdue, state agricultural colleges in Nebraska, Colorado and Missouri, and the Smithsonian Institution.
The focus of these programmes was to influence, and in some cases create, courses and programmes in business and economics whose curricula were organized around the principles of free enterprise and private property as the foundations for economic growth, prosperity and freedom. The scant industry attention to electrical engineering curricula underscores this point: the goal was not to fund advances in electrical generation technology or to ensure the next generation of American engineers, but to persuade American citizens that government involvement in the marketplace was a bad idea.
The list of institutions known to have declined to participate is short: the University of Chicago, Princeton, Columbia and the City University of New York. Among the copious documentary records, only a handful of letters attest to a clear rejection of the industry proposals. The dean of the Business School at the City College of New York wrote in response to an industry offer to help fund instruction: 'We find no difficulty in getting very competent instructors in the City of New York and we have adequate material for the successful conduct of our courses'. But this was atypical: evidence suggests that not only were most universities willing to work with NELA, they were enthusiastic.
NELA committees did not just provide the financial support to develop these courses; they also supervised the choice of topics and materials to be used in them. At Penn State, a professor developing a course in utility economics received a 15-page critique of his initial proposal. Among other things, he was asked not to use the word 'profit', because 'in the utility business, in a sense, there are no profits'. He was also asked to remove references to bribery and corruption. Six weeks later, the official who had made the request was pleased to report that his suggestions had been put into effect [33, p. 53] . At Missouri State University, a course taught by the dean of the School of Engineering included a lecture on 'the Public Utilities and their Relation to the Public' that the local NELA committee considered to be unsatisfactory. They asked the Dean to revise it; he did, and 800 copies of the revised lecture were printed and distributed to teachers around the state [33, p. 72] .
Much of the effort was focused on economics programmes, and the NELA champion in this regard was Ohio State's dean C. O. Ruggles, who in 1926 undertook a tour of economics departments around the country in an effort to generate support. NELA also helped to established programmes that did not already exist, and to stabilize ones that were just getting underway. One of these was the Harvard Graduate School of Business, created in 1913 but expanded and strengthened in the 1920s with a grant from NELA of at least $20 000 per year for several years; in 1927-1928, the figure was $30 000. That same year, the graduate school at Northwestern received $32 500 and the University of Michigan $12 349. (By comparison, the engineering programmes at Harvard and MIT received only $3000 each [35, p. 43] .)
Of course, the universities did not always deliver the results that NELA patrons wanted. One NELA representative noted that, despite many tens of thousands of dollars in payments to Harvard, 'the Association . . . found itself somewhat in the position of having got hold of something by the tail and not being able to let go and not knowing quite where the two beasts were going'. He concluded that 'the association may need a 'reciprocal' [34, p. 69] . Nevertheless, around that time Harvard recruited Dean Ruggles to join its faculty [34, pp. 47, 48] .
As in the alteration of textbooks, NELA tried to create the appearance that the programmes were the educators' own idea. The way to do that, one executive explained, was to recruit someone on the inside to play this role: 'I feel that you will not get quite the results you wish if you go direct to the educators yourself. In this State [Colorado] , while the idea originated in the committee, it reached the colleges and universities through a man high in educational circles who broached the subject, without mentioning the public utilities as being interested. Therefore, the colleges [could think that] on their own volition, [they] developed the idea and the committee [merely] volunteered to render all possible assistance' ( [33, p. 43] , see also http://college.cengage.com/history/ayers_primary_sources/vetoesmuscle_shoalsbill_1931.htm); (http://bbe.umn.edu/sites/ bbe.umn.edu/files/BBEs%20Rich%20History.pdf) and (http://www.asabe.org/awards-landmarks/asabe-historic-landmarks/the-red-wing-project-on-utilization-of-electricity-in-agriculture -53.aspx).
Discussion
Like the tobacco and fossil fuel industries in later years, the electricity industry made an argument that was both empirical and ideological. Empirically, the industry claimed that publically generated electricity was more expensive. Ideologically, the industry claimed that government involvement in the marketplace was socialistic and un-American, and that what was at stake was nothing less than freedom and the American way of life. The expressed aim of the NELA project was not simply to fight or support a particular piece of legislation, but to alter the way Americans thought about private property, capitalism and regulation. To this end, they had to persuade people that certain facts about electricity generation and its costs were not what technical experts claimed they were, and that their own ideological claims, by contrast, rested on factual foundations. Uncertainty created opportunities for such persuasion to occur.
To use the term 'factual foundations' is not to invoke a positivist conception of those foundations nor a realist conception of scientific theories, much less to endorse an absolutist vision of scientific truth. (David Bloor, in his recent book, The Enigma of the Aerofoil, is eloquent on these distinctions [36] .) It is rather to point out that it is in the character of propaganda to create arguments that one knows are untrue, or at least misleading. But what defines a technical claim as misleading? The answer necessarily involves a comparison with the conclusions of independent experts. In this case, the dubious claims were that public electricity was more expensive than private electricity, and that the industry had not engaged in questionable practices-claims that experts at the time and in later years concluded were untrue.
In his 'insider-speaks out' narrative about propaganda in the health insurance industry, former executive Wendell Potter stresses that the defining aspect of propaganda (as opposed to what might be accepted as reasonable public relations and reasoned differences of opinion and interpretation) is the deliberate attempt to undermine information that technical experts consider established [37] . It is, as Markowitz & Rosner [6, 7] have insisted, a matter of conscious denial and deceit. But stakeholders are able to do this in part because of the real uncertainties that surround technical claims.
The electricity industry, like the tobacco, lead paint, chemical, fossil fuel and insurance industries, exploited uncertainty by constructing competing empirical claims, at least some of which they knew were untrue (or at least misleading), and by insisting that government involvement in the marketplace was a threat to freedom, despite well-documented evidence to the contrary elsewhere in the world. It is in this sense that we may conclude-as did the FTC at the time-that the NELA campaign was propaganda, motivated by self-interest and rationalized by the ideology of free market capitalism.
To invoke ideology is not to suggest that ideology is the only 'filler' available to 'plug gaps' created by epistemological or evidentiary uncertainty, much less to accept the ideology of no ideology ( [38] ; see my discussion in [39] ). It is rather to highlight how uncertainty provides an opportunity for stakeholders to create counter-arguments that may be ideologically based or ideologically justified, and to construct political claims under the rubric of empirical ones. The argument of this paper is that these are opportunities that stakeholders have repeatedly used.
It is not the intent of this paper to suggest what a good (much less ideal) response to uncertainty should be, either by scientists or by other interested parties. As John Dewey [40] noted nearly a century ago, there are many possible responses to uncertainty, and any quest to eliminate it is doomed to fail. What I am arguing is that if scientists respond to and attempt to create social consensus by re-doubling their efforts to make their technical information less uncertain, this effort is unlikely to achieve their desired ends. To the contrary, the history recounted here suggests that if scientific communities attempt to address disinformation with more scientific information, however well articulated, while ignoring the social and political dimensions of the question at stake, that effort is likely to fail. It is not necessarily the case, as Dan Sarewitz has argued, that more science will make the controversy worse, but it is the case (as he argues) that scientific information cannot resolve concerns or address arguments that are fundamentally not scientific ( [41] , see also [25, 42] ).
The history recounted here also suggests that, insofar as ideology may be a driver for reasoning-and the specific ideology of free market capitalism is a driver that we see recurring in otherwise diverse cases-the phenomenon of motivated reasoning is one to which the scientific community should attend. Psychologists use this term to refer to the tendency 'to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of accurate beliefs'. The classic example is the questionable referee call, which is generally seen as correct by the fans whose team benefited from the call but incorrect by the fans whose team suffered from it (http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/5/15/motivated-reasoning-its-cognates.html).
Numerous scholars have noted that commitment to the values and principles of free market capitalism is common among Americans who reject the scientific evidence of climate change [1, 12, [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] . Heath & Gifford [44] have documented a strong correlation between what they designate as 'free market ideology' and the beliefs that global climate change is not occurring, is not humancaused, or will have positive effects-all positions at odds with the consensus of the international scientific community [50] . McCright and Dunlap, in numerous papers over the past decade [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] , have demonstrated how free market ideals underlay organized US conservatives' rejection of results of climate science and policies to control greenhouse gas emissions.
Heath and Gifford label these positions as 'disbelief', and find that they are also positively correlated with anthropocentrism and environmental apathy, and negatively correlated with ecocentrism and self-efficacy (defined as the belief that one's personal actions can significantly affect the outcome). Dan Kahan and his co-workers have shown that such views motivate the reasoning of many American conservatives to reject the scientific evidence of climate change-further reinforcing the conclusion that offering more scientific information will not alter their positions. Indeed, among those who already have firm views, Kahan argues, it has a tendency to harden them [51, 52] . Lewandowsky et al. [53] have offered an extreme version of such entrenchment, documenting how, for some conservatives, commitment to a free-market worldview spills over into a general distrust in science and even into conspiracist ideation in which climate science is considered to be a liberal hoax of enormous reach. These findings help to account for why corporate actors would invoke the idea that action on climate change is a threat to freedom: it enables them to generate allies among groups and individuals with whom they might not otherwise have common motivation. In Latourian [54] terms, it enables corporate actors to find and enrol diverse groups and individuals as allies.
If one holds a prior commitment to the virtues and efficacy of laissez-faire capitalism, then one may be motivated to reject evidence of market failure. Indeed, scepticism about scientific warnings of impending trouble could be viewed as rational, because it follows, on this view, that markets will respond and offer solutions to the problem. It is also the case, however, that this particular form of rationality aligns with the self-interest of those for whom the economic [47] have stressed that, in the USA, such views are most commonly held by white males; Gladwin et al. [43] make a comparable point about 'northern elites'. Kahan et al. [52] stress that the rejection of scientific conclusions about anthropogenic climate change arises from the interests that individuals have in aligning their positions with those with whom they share ties-what they label the 'cultural cognition thesis'. In the case of white American men, this frequently means aligning with the positions of the Republican Party.
This, however, pushes the question back to why the US Republican party has taken a position so at odds with scientific findings. The story recounted here contributes to answering that question by offering a larger historical framework, particularly in relation to our collective views of the limits of market capitalism, the role of the government in addressing market failure, and the warrant for restrictions on business and industry. Recall that Herbert Hoover was the last Republican president before the New Deal, which dramatically extended federal government oversight over business and industry, as well as the role of the federal government in labour markets. Hoover argued that government involvement in the marketplace was 'the negation of the ideals upon which our civilization has been based. This idea was aggressively revived by the most popular Republican president of the post-war period, Ronald Reagan, who came into office promising to reverse the New Deal and scale back the Federal government. These are now the guiding principles of American conservatism (http://terpconnect.umd.edu/∼jklumpp/ comm461/lectures/reagan.html); (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpPt7xGx4Xo). Insofar as the argument against the reality of climate change in the USA has often taken the form of insisting that climate change will be used as a lever to expand governmental reach, it follows that those who oppose the latter will tend towards scepticism of the former [1] .
Motivated reasoning is not restricted to conservatives and conspiracy theorists: the crux of the idea is that we are all susceptible. In her detailed ethnography of a Norwegian community, Norgaard [55] has shown how Norwegians, who generally take climate change seriously, may nevertheless at times downplay it, as they are motivated to discount a problem they feel powerless to fix (see also [56, 57] ).
Nor are scientists immune. In her recently published study of the scientific and social discourse on the aftereffects of the Chernobyl nuclear power accident, Kuchinskaya [58] suggests that one reason for the divergence in conclusions between international and local experts involves a difference in motivation. The former, who are numerically, institutionally and socially dominant, view the effects as very small, whereas the latter believe that the effects are great; she labels these groups 'minimalists' and 'maximalists'. Kuchinskaya suggests that the minimalists are affected by their close relationships with the nuclear industry and their position in international organizations that have historically promoted nuclear power, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. To accept serious adverse effects from Chernobyl would be to fight the dominant social, intellectual and political currents in which they swim. Conversely, scientists from affected areas in Belarus and the Ukraine are affected by a desire to serve their communities and help them obtain badly needed international aid. To dismiss the severity of the effects would be to abandon the communities that they see themselves as serving. Using the cultural cognition framework, we might say that the former are part of a culture that views the risk as small and worth the benefits, whereas the latter are part of a culture that has experienced the risks as substantial and is unconvinced that they have outweighed the rewards. Both groups take positions consistent with the cultures in which they operate.
An important element that distinguishes the Chernobyl case from others we might consider is that there is disagreement and division among technical experts. This is expressed not only epistemically, as they come to divergent conclusions, but also linguistically, as the minimalists publish primarily in English and the maximalists in Slavic languages, and socially, as the former have greater access to communications media and other mechanisms to convey their conclusions efficaciously. In contrast, as scholars close to the issue have stressed, there is no substantive disagreement among diverse technical experts on the reality and causes of anthropogenic climate change or the dangers of tobacco use. To point this out is not to assert that an expert consensus in any particular case is necessarily correct. Kuhn's [59] famous notion of the scientific paradigm shift was based on the observation that history offered numerous examples of scientific experts re-evaluating views that were previously widely held. For this reason, as well as many others, raising doubt about scientific claims can certainly at times be justified. It is also well established, particularly in feminist philosophy of science, that non-epistemic motivations may yield (positive) epistemic (as well as political) results [60] [61] [62] [63] . But it is relevant to note that many alleged examples of reversals of scientific fortune are revealed on closer examination to involve dissension in the scientific ranks across disciplinary, linguistic or national divides, or the impacts of conflict of interest and motivated reasoning [36, [64] [65] [66] . This is why the issue of expert consensus and dissent is so crucial: consensus is a significant marker because it helps to clarify the question of motivation, to distinguish between elements of a scientific research programme that remains in play and elements that are viewed by experts as settled, and, above all, because in the absence of unmediated access to truth the conclusions of experts are our best available surrogate.
Conclusion
Nye concluded that the 'public revulsion that the NELA hearings caused put [rural] electrification back on the public agenda . . . and prepared the way for New Deal utility legislation' [26, p. 340] . That may be true, but it did not stop industry from continuing to fight the idea in the 1930s, when it accused the Roosevelt administration of planning to take over the social order, and again in the 1960s, when it sponsored a series of red-baiting advertisements targeting the expansion of federal hydropower [33] . Moreover, despite the success of rural electrification under the New Deal, for better or worse the electricity industry in the USA remains far less strictly regulated than in most other industrialized nations.
Moreover, the economics profession in the USA is known for the singularity and intensity with which it promotes free-market principles, particularly in comparison with economics departments in other parts of the world [67] . The Harvard Graduate School of Business, for example, employs only one faculty member in the arena of regulatory studies, which he describes as 'long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work' (http://www. hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=6518). And on a related note, when the municipality of Boulder, CO, recently announced that it would not renew its contracts with a private utility but would instead form its own publicly held municipal utility, it was charged with a lawsuit from the utility that claimed in effect that the city did not have the legal right to let the contracts expire, as well as by a private citizen claiming that this decision was not in the interests of the city's residents because it would cost more money (http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ ci_25890086/xcel-sues-void-boulder-utility-formation). While many factors have contributed to the American predilection for private sector solutions and deregulated markets, and to the dominance of laissez-faire frameworks in American economic education in the second half of the twentieth century [68] , one wonders if at least one of these is the legacy of the NELA campaign. NELA did not stop rural electrification, but it may well have left a lasting legacy on the teaching of economics in American universities and on the interpretation of what, precisely, is American about the American way of life.
